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FAMILY DEVELOPMENT DEDUCTIONS-AN
ALTERNATIVE TO REPEALING THE ESTATE TAX
Richard J. Kovach*
I. INTRODUCTION
Opposing political and social interests have long conducted a
vigorous debate on whether gratuitous transfers of wealth should
invoke federal excise taxes.' Attempts to eliminate wealth trans-
fer taxes reached a peak in the summer of 2000, when the Senate
passed repeal legislation overwhelmingly approved by the House
of Representatives.' Those supporting repeal point out that
wealth transfer taxation discourages work and savings while en-
couraging consumption.' They further assert that transfer taxa-
tion revenue does not constitute a very significant portion of total
federal revenue.4 The supporters of repeal also emphasize how
the complexity of these taxes has created a parasitic service in-
dustry that artificially extracts value from the national economy.'
Those who favor wealth transfer taxes point out that tax-free
* McDowell Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law. A.B., 1970,
Oberlin College; J.D., 1974, Harvard Law School.
1. Inter vivos and testamentary transfers of wealth merge for estate tax computa-
tions. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1994) (unifying the estate tax with the gift tax by means of a single
rate table, effectively making death transfers the last of a potential series of wealth dispo-
sitions). In order to tax wealth transfers at least once per generation, I.R.C. § 2601 im-
poses a generation-skipping tax in aid of the estate and gift taxes. I.R.C. § 2601 (1994).
Accordingly, the debate over wealth transfer taxation involves three different transfer
taxes having a common purpose.
2. Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. 8, 106th Cong. (2000) (vetoed by Presi-
dent Clinton in August, 2000).
3. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation,
104 YALE L.J. 283, 364 (1994).
4. Estate and gift taxation accounted for only 1.4% of total federal taxes collected
during 1997. I.LS. DATA BooK, PUB. 55B 3 (1997).
5. See Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnel], Reassessing the Role for Wealth Transfer
Taxes, 45 NATL TAX J. 119, 133-38 (1992), for a short review of wealth transfer tax avoid-
ance and its economic costs.
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wealth transfers would jeopardize the overall progressivity of the
federal tax system.6 In addition, inordinate wealth transfers can
discourage the personal development and economic productivity
of recipients, as well as encourage profligate consumption while
many citizens suffer economic need that could lessen under a
proper redistribution of excessive wealth.7 Those in favor of
wealth transfer taxation tend to view taxation in general as a
useful social mechanism to promote fairness and lessen the wid-
ening financial gap between the wealthiest and poorest citizens.'
To date, the best technical accommodation between these op-
posing views of wealth transfer taxation remains the deduction
for charitable transfers.9 Charitable transfer deductions have no
dollar limitations, allowing even the wealthiest citizens to escape
transfer taxation. ° Charitable transfers, however, do restrict the
ability of wealthy persons to benefit their own families." Never-
theless, many wealthy persons like charitable transfers because
benevolent donations directly ameliorate social needs without
causing government to serve as an intermediary between source
and application. 2
6. An official speaking for the United States Treasury Department recently sup-
ported wealth transfer taxation by stating that "repeal [of the transfer excises] would have
'a negative impact on the overall progressivity of the tax system' and create a 'significant
loss' of revenue." Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1999, at Al.
7. Economist Paul Krugman refers to the revenue raised by wealth transfer taxation
in this context: "[Ilt is roughly what the federal government spends on the earned-income
tax credit, a program that helps millions of poor workers .... and it's more than twice our
total spending on foreign aid, and around five times as much as the non-military compo-
nent of that aid." Paul Krugman, Death and Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2000, at A27.
8. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J.
259, 274-83 (1983).
9. Unlimited deductions for properly made charitable transfers occur under I.R.C. §
2055 which grants a deduction for estate tax purposes and I.R.C. § 2522 which allows for a
gift tax deduction. I.R.C. § 2055 (1994 & Supp. 1998); I.R.C. § 2522 (1994). Transfers to
charitable organizations escape imposition of the generation-skipping tax. I.R.C. §
2651(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) (assigning charitable organizations to the transferor's generation,
thus making a charitable transfer not generation-skipping).
10. In contrast to charitable deductions under wealth transfer taxation, the charitable
deduction for income tax purposes imposes precise limitations that generally vary accord-
ing to a taxpayer's level of adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 170(b) (Supp. 1998) (estab-
lishing various percentage limitations).
11. Because qualifying charitable recipients must have an organizational status, no
charitable transfer deduction results from a direct payment by a benefactor to an individ-
ual, regardless of the recipient's need. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2055(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (de-
fining qualifying recipients as political entities, corporations, trusts, or other organiza-
tions).
12. Taxpayers typically dislike at least some tax expenditures, whether pertaining to
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Despite the role of charitable deductions in ostensibly ad-
dressing the disparate concerns of both opponents and proponents
of wealth transfer taxation, both sides express concerns about the
inefficiencies of charitable transfers. Opponents of wealth trans-
fer taxation dislike how charitable transfers conflict with family
benefit, 3 while wealth taxation proponents focus on technical fea-
tures of charitable contribution deductions that address perceived
abuses. 4 Neither side appears totally happy with the role of
charitable transfer deductions in simultaneously offering tax re-
lief and redistribution of wealth toward social goals.
This article outlines a proposal to create a new transfer tax de-
duction that would simultaneously reduce pressures to repeal
wealth transfer taxes and promote wealth redistribution. This
proposed deduction best takes the name "family development de-
duction" as used throughout this article.' Family development
military spending, welfare programs, or "political pork." Choosing how to use one's money
to produce a social good becomes an important consideration for those who make gratui-
tous transfers. Support for the choices of benefactors in the form of tax relief promotes
pluralism, as evidenced by the great number and variety of charitable organizations that
exist. Family development deductions would further promote pluralism by addressing so-
cial needs while providing personal benefits for a benefactor's descendants.
13. This kind of conflict exists when a benefactor attempts to take a charitable contri-
bution deduction for a large gift to a qualifying private foundation and then involve rela-
tives in the financial affairs of the foundation so as to promote family control and benefit.
See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Es-
tate Tax Avoidance, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 161, 204 (1977) (lamenting the use of charitable
gifts of conservation easements to generate tax deductions respecting property still subject
to a donor's desired personal uses). Qualified conservation easements now must meet
technical requirements set forth in I.R.C. § 170(h), incorporated by reference for estate tax
purposes in I.R.C. § 2055(f). As a further example of an abuse, transferors to charitable
lead trusts (involving a gift of an annuity interest to charity followed by a noncharitable
remainder interest) sometimes attempt to inflate gift and estate tax deductions by having
the charity's interest last for the life of an unrelated terminally ill person expected to die
before the applicable standard life expectancy taken from IRS valuation tables. The
Treasury Department recently cracked down on this morbid technique. See Prop. Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.170A-6(c)(2), (e), 65 Fed. Reg. 17,835 (Apr. 5, 2000); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-
2(e), 65 Fed. Reg. 17,835 (Apr. 5, 2000); Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2522(c)-3(c), (e), 65 Fed.
Reg. 17,835 (Apr. 5, 2000). Conflicts involving tax allowances, private benefit, and chari-
table interests have produced various technical accommodations for decades, but mani-
fested broad results in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 492 (1969) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
(creating regulatory distinctions between private foundations and public charities and
subjecting the former to numerous impositions expressed as penalty taxes in I.R.C. §§
4940-4948 (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
15. As discussed more fully infra at Part IV.B., a "family" need not consist only of
beneficiaries who have a blood relationship with the benefactor. Because wealth can best
benefit successive generations of beneficiaries if held in trust, this article will frequently
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deductions, like charitable transfer deductions, would permit
wealth owners to transfer assets without taxation for the benefit
of a potentially large class of beneficiaries. Unlike charitable
transfer deductions, family development deductions would apply
to transfers that directly benefit relatives of the donor (although
in a restrained manner).
Recipients of wealth from family development deduction trusts
would first have to demonstrate both the personal and social
benefit of their distributions. Family development deduction trust
distributions would not enable expenditures for extravagant
homes and high living, private collections (whether of art, auto-
mobiles, or ex-spouses), or other indicia of opulence. By contrast,
family development recipients would use their distributions to
further their educations, provide adequately for their spouses and
children (who are unable to do so for themselves), take sabbati-
cals from work to perform social service, alleviate economic need
pertaining to necessities, capitalize a small business, fund proj-
ects to enhance personal spirituality and good mental health,
provide for needed medical and elder care, or permit other similar
applications that blend personal and social benefits. 6
II. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN
THE FAMLY CONTEXT
A. Technical Features of the Charitable Contribution Deduction
Require Transfer of Wealth to Outsiders and Discourage
Family Involvement in Grant Administration
From a donor's perspective, charitable giving directly conflicts
with family giving. The donor can avoid taxation by selecting, or
creating, a charitable recipient that conforms with statutory re-
quirements mandating institutional characteristics for the do-
refer to "family development deduction trusts."
16. The socially useful personal relief or developmental endeavors a benefactor could
fund would potentially reflect at least as worthy and diverse an array of human pursuits
as allowed for tax-exempt organizations, which can serve "religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes or to foster national or interna-
tional amateur sports competition.., or for the prevention of cruelty to children or ani-
mals...." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). As used herein, "charitable" refers to organizations
that embrace any of the above purposes.
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nee.'7 Yet no deduction results if the donor simply transfers
money or other property directly to a needy person, even if the
needy recipient has only a weak relationship to the donor.' The
donor must transfer value to an appropriate institution acting as
an intermediary that selects proper beneficiaries. 9 Attempts by
the donor to secure a charitable contribution deduction while in-
directly determining specific recipients tend to fail.2" If a donor
wishes to transfer wealth directly to family members without
taxation, the benefactor must rely on other technical devices, like
the unified credit, which greatly restrict the potential tax savings
available.2
The fundamental restriction against letting family members
share in charitable transfers comes from statutory language that
requires recipients of deductible transfers to be "organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary,
or educational purposes.... no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private.., individual ... ."22 The
17. If the donor creates the charitable recipient (establishes a new organization to
carry out good works with the donor's endowment), lack of public support will likely result
in private foundation status and thus heavier scrutiny, regulation, and exposure to pen-
alty taxation. See I.R.C. § 509 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (defining private foundations); supra
note 14 (referencing private foundations); infra note 26 (referencing private foundations).
18. See supra note 11.
19. See supra note 11.
20. A fund created primarily for the support of a relative manifests private benevo-
lence, not public charity. James Sprunt Benevolent Trust v. Comm'r, 20 B.T.A. 19, 24
(1930). A trust to educate and care for poor members of a family is not a charitable trust.
Hardage v. Hardage, 84 S.E.2d 54, 55-56 (Ga. 1954). Similarly, an educational trust to
benefit one's descendants does not fulfill the charitable definition. Griffin v. United States,
400 F.2d 612, 615-16 (6th Cir. 1968). A class of relatives does not receive benefits in a
public manner simply because it constitutes an entire family tree dating back to 1647. In
re Beekman's Estate, 134 N.E. 183, 184-85 (N.Y. 1921).
21. The estate tax unified credit and the gift tax unified credit permit tax-free trans-
fers up to $675,000 in 2000 and 2001. I.R.C. § 2010 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (regarding the
estate tax unified credit); I.R.C. § 2505 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (regarding the gift tax unified
credit). The gift tax exclusion of $10,000 per year per donee (doubled with spousal consent)
similarly permits tax-free outright transfers regardless of the donee's use. I.R.C. § 2503(b)
(Supp. 1998) (limiting the exclusion to present interest gifts); I.R.C. § 2513 (1994) (treating
a gift made by a spouse as made one-half by each spouse). I.R.C. § 2503(e) permits unlim-
ited tax-free gifts for tuition or medical care, but requires direct payment to service pro-
viders, thus preventing donee reimbursements. I.R.C. § 2503(e) (1994).
22. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B-C) (1994). The private inurement prohibition appears in I.R.C.
§ 170(c)(2)(B-C) with respect to income tax deductions for charitable contributions, I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) which allows for an income tax exemption for qualifying recipient organiza-
tions, I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2) with respect to estate tax charitable deductions, and I.R.C. §
2522(a)(2) with regard to gift tax charitable deductions. I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B-C), 501(c)(3),
2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2) (1994).
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public purpose notion behind this language subordinates family
interests in favor of dispositions that benefit broader classes of
persons largely unknown to the grantor. For example, a trans-
feror cannot secure a deduction when a class of scholarship takers
contains only grandnieces and grandnephews.2 1 Similarly, no de-
duction results even if the beneficiary class consists of individuals
born with the grantor's surname shared by hundreds of families
in the United States.2' The best a benefactor can do in attempting
to allow family members to benefit from a deductible transfer is
to make a mere statement of preference, without imposing a re-
quirement that needy family members be included among those
considered for relief by the recipient organization.
Not only do family members get squeezed out as potential re-
cipients of charitable donations, but their presence as directors or
managers of charitable entities comes under close regulatory
scrutiny.26 In the context of charitable private foundations, mem-
bers of the family of a substantial contributor assume the status
of "disqualified person[s] .1"27 Accordingly, those members can trig-
ger substantial penalty taxes against themselves and a private
foundation as a result of their transactions and holdings. 2' Be-
cause of potential abuses involving large charitable contribution
deductions, a donor and the donor's family can only weakly main-
tain involvement in a charitable organization's ongoing opera-
tions. The tax system greatly favors control by outsiders in the
23. Davis v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 416, 425 (1970).
24. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-31-004 (Apr. 30, 1996).
25. See, e.g., Estate of Robinson v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 19 (1942).
26. The public charity versus private foundation distinction prevents those who make
large donations from exerting undue influence over a charitable organization for the bene-
fit of private interests. Accordingly, the private foundation definition stresses public sup-
port as a key criterion to avoid private foundation status and additional regulation. I.R.C.
§ 509(a) (1994). Large amounts of public support help ensure that entity management will
not come under private control. Even "supporting organizations," exempted from private
foundation status and public support requirements, I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (1994), must assure
revenue officials that their controlling boards receive sufficient input from the charitable
organizations they support under a "responsiveness" test that blunts potential private in-
fluences. See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2) (1972) (providing technical mechanisms to as-
sure an "effective voice" by the beneficiary organization in the management of the sup-
porting organization).
27. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1), (d) (1994) (defining various family members as disqualified
persons for transactional purposes).
28. I.R.C. § 4941 (1994) (imposing penalty taxes on acts of self-dealing between a dis-
qualified person and a charitable private foundation); I.R.C. § 4943(a)(1) (1994) (imposing
penalty taxes on charitable private foundations that have "excess business holdings" in
enterprises also owned in part by disqualified persons).
[Vol. 35:27
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governance of entities permitted to enjoy income tax exemption
while receiving deductible contributions.29
B. Integrating Family Development Deduction Trusts with
Traditional Charitable Giving
The restrictions against family beneficence and managerial in-
volvement respecting charitable organizations would not apply to
family development deduction trusts. Transfer tax deductibility
would result from a benefactor's setting up a fund that would de-
liberately permit family members to receive grants similar to
those dispensed to outsiders under charitable arrangements. °
These grants could include awards for education, research, spiri-
tual and social missions, literary and artistic endeavors, child
care, elder care, medical needs, and a variety of other activities.3
The number of potential grants would multiply as the grantor's
family grew, until even a large family development deduction
trust would consume its income with distributions-as various
foundations now operate under charitable endowment.32
Unlike charitable endowments, family development deduction
trusts would only avoid wealth transfer taxation-the estate tax,
gift tax, and generation-skipping tax.33 Family development de-
duction trusts would not involve either income tax exemption for
the trust or income tax deductibility for a donor making contribu-
tions to the trust.34 Consequently, the private versus public pur-
pose difference behind traditional charitable entities would not
apply entirely to family development deduction trusts, since they
need not generate any income taxation advantages not already
found in the current scheme involving transfers to private
trusts.
3 5
29. See supra note 26.
30. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing how and why the concept of "family" should ex-
pansively include persons other than blood descendants of the benefactor).
31. See supra note 16 (illustrating that tax-favored organizations can have many pur-
poses other than the mere alleviation of poverty).
32. See infra Part IVA. (discussing possibilities for family development deduction
trusts to operate in perpetuity, like charitable trusts).
33. See supra note 9.
34 Cf. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (exempting charitable organizations
from entity income taxation); I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (1994) (creating an income tax deduction
for contributors to charitable organizations).
35. Thus, "Subchapter J," which governs the income taxation consequences to gran-
2001]
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Yet, family development deduction trusts would result in ex-
pansion of the class of family beneficiaries until recipients might
exceed, in number and diversity, those qualifying for aid from
traditional charitable entities. 6 Family development deduction
trusts would have the potential to transform what might look like
purely private benefit during the early years of a fund into a form
of public benefit as a family, which a grantor could alternatively
define broadly at the outset, and gradually expand into a very
large group of individuals through procreation, adoption, and in-
law assimilation.
If traditional charitable organizations see their purposes par-
tially fulfilled through the grant making processes of family de-
velopment deduction trusts, they might object less to a putative
diversion of dollars." Moreover, family development deduction
trusts could actually assist traditional charitable organizations
directly in at least two ways. First, family grants could free indi-
viduals, at least for temporary periods, from the necessity of
earning a living by allowing the equivalent of sabbaticals to en-
gage in charitable works. For instance, a family development de-
duction trust beneficiary who became a public school teacher
could apply for a leave of absence for an academic year to serve as
a volunteer under a charitable organization that provides lan-
guage instruction to the children of impecunious immigrants.39
tors, beneficiaries, and trustees of trusts, would apply to family development deduction
trusts. See I.R.C. §§ 641-692 (1994 & Supp. 1998). This means that distributions to the
beneficiaries of such trusts would cause income recognition to the extent of a trust's dis-
tributable net income. See I.R.C. § 652(a) (1994). Thus, charitable trusts would still gener-
ate tax advantages not shared by family development deduction trusts. The purpose of the
latter would relate solely to acceptable ways for benefactors to avoid wealth transfer taxa-
tion while benefiting family members.
36. For instance, a charitable transfer today might generate uill tax benefits while
serving only the artists (and art lovers) in a particular small community. See Goldsboro
Art League v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 337, 343-45 (1980). Indeed, benefactors often make tax-
favored transfers that only benefit small groups of professors, as evidenced by the many
professorship titles held by selected academics (including the author of this article). Fam-
ily development deduction trust beneficiaries could easily and quickly grow into a class
that far exceeds the number of professors at a law school.
37. An enabling statute for family development deductions would thus limit authori-
ties, like those discussed supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (disallowing family
benefit), to charitable trust transfers that attempt to invoke the full range of tax benefits,
not just wealth transfer taxation relief.
38. Traditional charities would still generate tax advantages that could give them an
edge over family development deduction trusts respecting income taxation. See supra
notes 34-35.
39. Family development grants could encourage volunteerism benefiting a variety of
[Vol. 35:27
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The grant could cover the applicant's expenses and salary for the
year.4" The teacher might simultaneously avoid career burnout,
perform significant charitable work, and continue to fulfill all
personal financial obligations. Clearly, the organization receiving
the teacher's free and valuable services would also obtain a direct
benefit.
Second, family development deduction trusts could make direct
distributions to traditional charitable organizations, particularly
in earlier years when large endowments would produce trust in-
come substantially in excess of allowable applications for grants.4'
The benefactor could anticipate surpluses of taxable trust income
over permissible distributions and add a trust provision to make
interim distributions to designated classes of charities. These dis-
tributions would permit the fiduciary (not the benefactor) to take
income tax deductions against trust income while avoiding accu-
mulations of trust income taxed at rapidly graduated rates. Fam-
ily development deduction trusts could thus directly benefit tradi-
tional charities while taking advantage of post-transfer income
tax relief now enjoyed by private express trusts.42
Even without directly benefiting from income distributions or
volunteer services, traditional charities might concede that family
development deduction trusts would present a less threatening
competitor for donative dollars than gifts to support family opu-
lence under an outright repeal of wealth transfer taxes. For ex-
isting nonprofit organizations, the "lesser evil" between family
development deduction trusts and elimination of all wealth trans-
fer taxation surely would reside in the former.
traditional charitable organizations that rely as much on volunteer services as on cash do-
nations. For example, consider Habitat for Humanity.
40. Perhaps the grant could also cover a potential loss of pension contributions or
benefits by allowing for the purchase of a single premium annuity commencing payments
to the volunteer in coordination with the distributee's regular pension system.
41. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing, by contrast, how a benefactor might address
grant demand that greatly exceeds the trusts income by assigning distribution priorities).
42. See I.R.C. § 1(e) (1994) (respecting the rapidly graduated income tax rates appli-
cable to trusts). Offsetting relief can occur under I.R.C. § 642(c), which allows a deduction
for any amount of trust income paid or permanently set aside for a charitable purpose.
I.R.C. § 642(c) (1994).
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III. How FAMILY DEVELOPMENT DEDUCTION TRUSTS COULD
ACCOMMODATE A PHILOSOPHICAL COMPROMISE
A. The Vantage Point of the Propertied Class
Many persons who create substantial wealth spend inordinate
time and energy adjusting to the rigorous demands of an ex-
tremely competitive and unforgiving market economy. Their per-
sonal identification with economic success can create deep re-
sentment against outsiders, whether competitors or government,
who might encroach upon the prerogatives inherent in the forma-
tion and retention of substantial wealth.43 Of course, the builders
of wealth fully appreciate their mortality and the ultimate neces-
sity of parting with their material possessions. From a purely
personal perspective, the next best thing to taking wealth into an
afterlife, as envisioned by the ancient Egyptians, probably con-
sists of transferring it to one's own issue.
Yet, the creators of wealth often exhibit great ambivalence
when contemplating the transmission of substantial sums to fu-
ture generations whose desire to earn a living might thereby dis-
sipate. The process of creating wealth-at times brutish, rife with
anxiety, and fraught with risk-nonetheless has an instructional
quality that promotes an identity between striving for success
and self-esteem, personal development, and quality of life.' Con-
sequently, the creators of wealth, wishing only the best for their
progeny, often take great pains to avoid "silver spoon in-the-
mouth" syndrome as a family affliction.45 Frequently, wealthy
people deliberately attempt to sustain virtues and values that
mitigate temptations toward lassitude, ineptitude, self-
43. Apparently, not all holders of wealth would agree with Andrew Carnegie, who de-
clared in his essay, The Gospel of Wealth, that a rich person should, after acquiring
wealth, distribute it for the general welfare. ANDREW CARNEGIE, The Gospel of Wealth, in
THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH, AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 14 (Edward C. Kirkland ed., 1965).
Between the classical Ebenezer Scrooge (before he repented) and Andrew Carnegie exist
many wealth holders who would not mind benefiting both the general welfare and their
descendants simultaneously in a way that encourages their descendants to grow in stat-
ure.
44. Those who ascribe to this view no doubt find practical ways to implement it within
their families, such as requiring their children to work between semesters in high school
and college despite having no need for the extra money.
45. See Monica Langley, Trust Me, Baby: The House, the Money-It'll All Be Yours;
There's Just One Thing, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1999, at Al.
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centeredness, and other detrimental traits sometimes associated
with unearned wealth.46
Accordingly, the wealthy often wish to link wealth transmis-
sion with observance of designated values personally cherished
and deemed indispensable to success itself. Unsurprisingly, the
recent explosion of "new economy" wealth has encouraged an en-
hanced interest in estate planning techniques that emphasize
varying degrees of dead-hand control to promote the stated values
of benefactors.47 Just as the explosion of industrial wealth a hun-
dred or so years ago in the "Gilded Age" produced a social aware-
ness among philanthropic giants like Andrew Carnegie, today's
proliferation of wealth has also spurred philanthropy, as well as a
heightened sense that unearned wealth might cause detriment to
a benefactor's descendants. 48
Perhaps another difference between now and one hundred
years ago comes from a stronger current emphasis on how wealth
can yield greater opportunities for cultural attainments. At the
turn of the nineteenth century, penury among even the working
class was quite apparent and encouraged direct applications of
private largess to alleviate poverty.49 Today's post-New Deal so-
46. The "family incentive trust," described as the "latest fad in estate planning for the
affluent," lets successful parents transfer wealth to their children in proportion to each
child's conformity with designated behavior standards. Id. For instance, star baseball
pitcher Tom Glavine, who earns an $8,000,000 annual salary, has expressed a wish to use
an incentive trust to match his children's earned income up to $100,000. Id. Family devel-
opment deduction trusts would incorporate incentive elements, but not focus on the bene-
factor's children as much as on long-term human development in an ever-growing ex-
tended family. Additionally, family development deduction trusts could only warrant
exemption from wealth transfer taxation through a political compromise that would likely
emphasize awarding distributions upon need, social result, and personal benefit, rather
than by way of providing incentives or disincentives relating to specific conduct a benefac-
tor might whimsically and arbitrarily define.
47. For a discussion of the problems and opportunities facing practitioners of incen-
tive estate planning, see Howard M. McCue 1I, Planning and Drafting to Influence Behav-
ior, in THE THmTY-FOuRTH ANNUAL PHmIp E. HECKERLING INSTrrUTE ON ESTATE
PLANNING ch. 6 (Tina Hestrom Portuondo ed., 2000).
48. See Brigid McMenamin, Who's Spoiled?, FORBES, June 12, 2000, at 266 (discussing
the view that birth into riches need not doom a child's chances for success and providing
advice on "how to raise good kids amid opulence").
49. See Gordon M. Fisher, U.S. Census Bureau, From Hunter to Orshansky: An Over-
view of (Unofficial) Poverty Lines in the United States from 1904 to 1965 (1993),
http:/Jwww.census.gov/hhes/poverty/povmeas/papers/hstorsp4.html (last modified Dec. 13,
2000). Mr. Fisher demonstrates how efforts to provide measurenents of poverty thresh-
olds coincided at the beginning of the twentieth century with efforts to alleviate the acute
poverty of the time. Id.
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cial nets and greater affluence in general help focus charitable
dispositions toward human development at higher levels.0 Con-
sequently, the wealthy now seem to direct their wealth increas-
ingly toward spiritual development, the arts, and specific educa-
tional endeavors."
Supporting these endeavors in a way that could also benefit
generations of family members would greatly appeal to many
members of the propertied class, especially if family values,
achievement, and community benefit all coincided. Family devel-
opment deduction trusts could efficiently accomplish a joining of
these interests. As an added bonus, family development deduction
trusts might yield inestimable intangible benefits for a grantor.
A grantor could take a place of honor in a long family history as
an original benefactor whose largess, linking personal develop-
ment, need, and good works, extended to persons unborn at the
grantor's death but later brought together by more than mere ge-
nealogy.52 The values of the family benefactor, emphasized re-
peatedly via grants for education, family support, skill enhance-
ment, social improvement, and the like, would serve as a lasting
personal memorial to the benefactor. More importantly, the ever-
growing family would take on a life of its own shared ultimately
by hundreds or even thousands of individuals.53
The benefactor's family development scheme might provide
that successive generations of family members serve as trust ad-
visors or directors, elected upon merit by all family members eli-
50. In 1998, the official poverty level for a family of four was an annual income of
$16,660. JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, S. P60-
207, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, Table A-1 (1999). Adjusted for inflation to re-
flect 1998 dollars, in 1949 the annual income for United States' families was $16,589 or
less for forty percent of all families. Id. Presumably, going back fifty more years would re-
veal an even larger percentage of American families below current poverty levels, al-
though Census Bureau tables do not reflect data earlier than the 1940s.
51. In 1998, 63.7% of all charitable giving supported religion, education, arts, culture,
and humanities. AMERICAN ASS'N OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL, GIVING USA 1999: THE
ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1998 20 (Ann E. Kaplan ed., 1999).
52. For administrative suggestions on bringing together the class of beneficiaries who
would benefit under a family development deduction trust, see infra note 101 and accom-
panying text.
53. If a family produced children at the rate of just two per member, it would number
in the thousands after only a dozen generations. Since nobody can predict the future
course of procreation rates, enhancement of a family class through the inclusion of persons
having non-blood affinities might interest a benefactor with sufficiently large wealth. See
infra text accompanying notes 86-96.
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gible to apply for grants under a properly conducted voting proce-
dure.54 Family leadership at each generation would judge grant
applications in the manner now reserved for those who govern
charitable foundations.55 Family identity and cohesion would re-
sult from the mere necessity of keeping track of eligible grant ap-
plicants whose requests would be the subject of periodic meetings
to decide how best to dispense trust income.56 Most persons in the
family would eventually know the extent and composition of the
group, and a continuing sense of pride and opportunity would at-
tach to the status of being a family member, however large the
group might grow. 7 Family unity itself would become a memorial
that could easily outlast the razing of a building named for a
benefactor under the traditional charitable scheme. Even mem-
bers of the propertied class who otherwise staunchly resist wealth
redistribution might find such a notion highly attractive.
B. The Vantage Point of Wealth Redistributionists
Many persons who dislike large concentrations of wealth be-
lieve that wealth attainment too frequently occurs by chance or
results from manipulated competitive advantages within an im-
perfectly regulated market economy."8 Their personal belief in
structural economic unfairness fosters concern about abuses of
power that can result from large concentrations of wealth in pri-
54. Procedures frequently used by alumnae to elect college trustees might provide a
good model in this context. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
55. Family members need not serve as trustees of family development deduction
trusts, but could serve as elected advisors to trustees, which, as discussed infra Part IV.C.,
might best come from the ranks of institutional fiduciaries.
56. The issuance of annual reports outlining fund awards, activities, and investment
decisions would also generate significant interest among the growing class of family mem-
bers.
57. Family discourse can, of course, have a dark side that feeds off rivalries, dispari-
ties in talents or status, and clashes of opinion. Perhaps thoughtful benefactors could
structure a family development deduction trust in ways that would tend to mitigate such
unpleasant side effects. For instance, a clause in the governing instrument could invoke a
special trustee's review in the event distributions would tend to concentrate within a par-
ticular branch of a family.
58. See, for example, RICHARD HOFSTADER, SocIAL DARwINIsM IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT (Beacon Press 1992) (1944), in which the author offers this conclusory view
about the historical effects of business competition in America: "[Niothing is so unstable as
'pure' business competition; nothing is so disastrous to the unlucky or unskilled competi-
tor; nothing... is so difficult as to keep the growing number of the 'unfif reconciled to the
operations of such a regime." Id. at 201-02.
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vate hands. 9 Since wealth can come into private hands at the ex-
pense of wage earners, the environment, consumers, and other
social interests, redistributionists believe the wealthy should ac-
cept their mortality by transferring substantial sums for the
common good, especially in view of the unaddressed needs of nu-
merous citizens who find themselves in far less fortunate circum-
stances.6" From this vantage point, transferring great wealth to
family members encourages plutocratic excesses and contradicts
the tenet that earned rewards yield much more social utility than
wealth achieved only by the happenstance of birth.
Yet those who would break up large concentrations of wealth
often express ambivalence about whether redistribution best oc-
curs under governmental guidance or via pluralistic enterprise in
the form of numerous and varied nonprofit organizations. 6' Non-
profit enterprises annually dispense billions of dollars of donated
wealth without uniform administration to prioritize social needs,
which can range from the fundamental (food for the hungry) to
the sublime (support for a regional symphony orchestra).62 Be-
cause private charitable pursuits can supplement governmental
action, wealth redistributionists frequently applaud not just
charitable giving, but also support, or at least tolerate, related
tax benefits.63 Of all the tax benefits enjoyed by the wealthy, tax
59. See id. Mr. Hofstader continues his vitriolic conclusions about economic competi-
tion by commenting on what he views as changed attitudes toward the social role of those
who gather wealth: "In time the American middle class shrank from the principle it had
glorified, turned in flight from the hideous image of rampant competitive brutality, and
repudiated the once heroic entrepreneur as a despoiler of the nation's wealth and morals
and a monopolist of its opportunities." Id. at 202.
60. Not all socially conscious persons assume most personal wealth is ill-gotten, just
as not all wealth holders think the best way to dispense wealth is through familial disposi-
tions. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. An important aspect of family develop-
ment deduction trusts would come from their flexibility to accommodate a wide range of
views about the disbursement of wealth.
61. See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 69, 135-
36 (1990) (arguing for the imposition of a death tax rate of 100%, but conceding that a
limited list of exemptions should include at least some allowance for charitable transfers).
62. See John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in ANERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT ix,
xiii-xv (Brian O'Connell ed., 1983) (extolling the virtues of the diverse nonprofit sector of
America's economy, in contrast to the rigidity of governmental bureaucracies). Many bene-
factors, voting with their dollars, apparently believe that food for the soul has every bit the
importance of food for the body. See supra note 51.
63. Wealth redistributionists for many years have successfully argued for progressive
rates for both income taxation, see I.R.C. § 1 (1994), and estate taxation, see I.R.C. § 2001
(1994). Yet the continuous existence of income and estate tax charitable deductions, I.R.C.
§ 170 (1994 & Supp. 1998); I.R.C. § 2055 (1994 & Supp. 1998), since World War I indicates
that wealth redistributionists have not simultaneously strongly opposed charitable trans-
fer tax benefits.
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relief for charitable contributions seems the least offensive, even
though charitable dispositions help donors and donee organiza-
tions express a quite diverse range of values under a very broad
concept of community benefit.'
Similarly, wealth redistributionists might not object to tax-
favored transmissions of wealth to family members as long as
benefit flowed to growing numbers of persons who help fragment
wealth in diverse ways that fulfill a general standard of social
utility. If wealth deconcentrates among an extended family in a
manner that both benefits society and encourages salutary per-
sonal development, including social awareness and cultural at-
tainments, wealth redistributionists might accept family devel-
opment deduction trusts as readily as traditional charitable
giving.65 Redistribution through charitable entities would still oc-
cur, but family development deduction trusts would effect redis-
tribution by using generations of the donor's own issue.66
Consider distributions to descendants of a wealthy donor to
care for a disabled child or ailing elder, fund a trip to help clean
up devastated places after a natural disaster, or provide a down
payment for a first home when low earnings make home owner-
ship nearly impossible. The list of socially useful redistributions
within an ever growing family is limited only by the imagination.
For example, distributions might fund retirement benefits for
family members who work for employers that do not sponsor
qualified retirement arrangements.67 A grant could permit an
64. The Internal Revenue Service has apparently recognized a religious organization
having a membership of witches as worthy of tax beneficence. See Developments in the
Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1578 (1992) (citing Karen
Schwartz, Out of Closet, into Kitchen, Witches Win Nonprofit Tax Status As a Religion,
L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1989, at 4). In addition, tax allowances benefit many mainstream re-
ligious organizations that condemn sexual and other personal conduct at odds with views
much less than universally accepted. See id. at 1581.
65. What could give greater delight to redistributionists than to witness large for-
tunes used as inducements to make the progeny of the wealthy at once less plutocratic and
more socially conscious?
66. Presumably, plutocratic tendencies cannot pass genetically, but even if the human
genome project identifies a "plutocracy gene," carriers of that gene would run the risk of
mating with socially conscious redistributionists and thereby diluting the propensity
among future generations.
67. The prerogative to sponsor a tax-favored retirement arrangement belongs to em-
ployers, not employees, in the usual private employment situation. See Treas. Reg. §
1.401-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1976) (stating that a tax-qualified retirement plan "is a defi-
nite written program and arrangement which is communicated to the employees and
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abused spouse, especially one with children, financial freedom to
depart from the abuser. A family development deduction trust
could support retired grandparents who must raise grandchildren
abandoned by their parents." Grants might help parents
homeschool their children or permit a school teacher working in
an expensive area to afford a house within reasonable commuting
distance of work.69 Trust distributions could take the form of
scholarships to promising students whose parents cannot fund
college or graduate school at quality institutions. Distributions
might also provide educational aid to permit necessary or desir-
able career changes, ° or to permit tangible rewards for the out-
standing career accomplishments of public service workers.7'
The list easily continues to include funds to support voluntary
charitable works by sabbatical or part-time endeavor,72 seed capi-
tal to permit a beneficiary to pursue a promising business idea
that would create new job s and prosperity for a community,
health insurance premiums for family members whose employers
have no health insurance plan, payments on educational loans
taken out by family members who pursue low-paying public
service careers, expenses of adopting a child or the cost of raising
an orphaned child, funds to celebrate or reward important family
which is established and maintained by an employer. . . ."). Employees can establish their
own individual retirement accounts but cannot contribute more than $2,000 per year.
I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) (1994).
68. In such instance, a benefactor might consider making the parents of such hapless
children ineligible for distributions from the family development deduction trust even
though if the parents had been initially eligible for assistance, they might not have aban-
doned their children.
69. See Jonathan Kaufman, No R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Silicon Valley Puts Its Teachers
Through School of Hard Knocks, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2000, at Al (chronicling the dis-
comforting case of an experienced schoolteacher who cannot afford to live in the same
community as her students because of inordinately high local real estate values).
70. Law schools would no doubt benefit indirectly from this possibility.
71. Public service workers often feel unappreciated by the taxpayers who indirectly
employ them. Family appreciation in the form of a monetary award might encourage pub-
lic service employment and mitigate the competition between public and private sectors
for competent employees.
72. For example, a young plastic surgeon might interrupt a promising practice, with
support from a family development deduction trust, in order to join a team of surgeons
who voluntarily perform operations on children in impoverished countries who have been
horribly disfigured by accident or genetic bad luck. Both the unfortunate children and the
caring surgeon would share the good fortune implicit in the surgeon's having a wealthy
ancestor whose wealth stayed intact against both wealth transfer taxation and the poten-
tial waste of earlier progeny.
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milestones,73 and tuition for children or adults that permits artis-
tic, musical, and literary development.
Wealth redistributionists might thus witness the dissipation of
fortunes in the name of family cohesiveness and human develop-
ment over many generations. Wealth so expended would uplift,
not debase, its recipients. In time, every member of an extended
family would learn about the possibilities for using trust re-
sources to promote both social and personal development.74 These
possibilities would likely appeal to even the staunchest wealth
redistributionists who might otherwise have great reservations
about allowing large quantities of wealth to pass free of transfer
taxes to a benefactor's family.
IV. TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR FAMILY DEVELOPMENT
DEDUCTION TRUSTS
A. The Problem of the Rule Against Perpetuities
If the rule against perpetuities required termination before a
sufficient number of family beneficiaries accumulated under a
generously funded family development deduction trust, the de-
mand for grants might never exceed the trust's income. Conse-
quently, the trust would either accumulate income and poten-
tially pay income tax at rapidly graduated rates or operate
73. If a benefactor wished to promote long-lasting marital bonds as a family value, a
family development deduction trust might permit awards to couples in the family who
celebrate meaningful wedding anniversaries (e.g., ten, twenty-five, fifty years), perhaps
subject to income limitations as applied under the Internal Revenue Code for the phase-
out of certain tax benefits. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2 19 (g) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (setting adjusted
gross income limitations for the deductibility of contributions to individual retirement ac-
counts for active participants in other retirement arrangements). If promotion of long
marriages seems like an unlikely value to link to wealth transfer taxation avoidance, con-
sider how deductible contributions flow to tax-exempt religious organizations that regu-
larly provide family and marriage counseling and related services for their flocks.
74. Some creators of family development deduction trusts might want to insist on suf-
ficient dead-hand control to ensure total compliance with their personal values. Never-
theless, regulatory restraint against their free reign might keep them from preventing in-
terpretive slippage over time. The lure of substantial tax benefits would likely lessen their
objections, just as for charitable contributions. Consider whether Henry Ford today would
approve of all the various grants now made by the Ford Foundation. Similarly, benefactors
of family development deduction trusts could anticipate that over time, changing social
values might result in grant interpretations they cannot ultimately control, even with the
most contemplative drafting possible.
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primarily to make current charitable dispositions." As a further
detriment, at the end of the perpetuities period, the trust's corpus
would transfer to a relatively small number of family beneficiar-
ies free from family development restraints.76
Just as the rule against perpetuities eventually allowed for the
perpetual existence of charitable trusts, 7 the rule need not im-
pair family development deduction trusts. The purposes of the
rule-to encourage free alienability of property and discourage
dead-hand control over long durations7 -- do not conflict with the
family development deduction trust concept. The former purpose
could find expression in a technical requirement that the trustees
of family development deduction trusts hold a power of sale per-
mitting alienation of the original trust corpus.79 The dead-hand
control objection could result in a requirement to use independent
trustees for grant selection upon the advice of elected family
boards who exercise discretion under reasonable criteria. By this
means, a benefactor could pass some control to the living down
through the generations, subject to institutional supervision."
The movement toward complete abolition of the rule against
perpetuities has gained sufficient momentum that a number of
states now permit private dispositions of property in trust for un-
limited durations.8' Given that a trustor can generally select the
state law that governs a trust, the rule against perpetuities need
not prevent the use of wealth to encourage and reward family de-
75. See supra note 42.
76. Under the standard expression of the common law rule against perpetuities that
"no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest," family development deduction trusts
would unceremoniously end by the time a benefactor's great grandchildren become eligible
for distributions. JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (Roland Gray ed.,
4th ed. 1942).
77. See 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScOTw, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 365 (William Franklin
Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987).
78. THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.17 (Roger A. Cunningham et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993).
79. For perpetuities reform statutes that require a power of sale clause, see infra note
81.
80. The benefactor would have provided in the trust instrument general criteria for
the approval of distributions. Nonetheless, specific requests for distributions would have
to undergo scrutiny for need and merit, much as when scholarship or admissions commit-
tees at academic institutions review applications.
81. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/3(a-5) (1998); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §
2131.09(B)(1) (Anderson 1999).
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velopment in perpetuity. 2 Some states abolished the rule against
perpetuities in order to accommodate the relatively narrow
$1,000,000 generation-skipping tax exemption. 3 This abolish-
ment by some states suggests that many other states would act
similarly to accommodate an even more significant transfer tax
allowance if a family development deduction proposal reached
enactment.
The irony resulting from application of the rule against perpe-
tuities is that, by insisting that wealth not be "tied up" beyond a
stated period, the rule actually prevents wealth from being
shared among an increasingly larger group of family members.
Given the normal suspicions, competitiveness, and other tensions
that tend to afflict familial relationships, many families would
have difficulty acting in concert toward plutocratic goals as the
group expanded, even absent family development restraints as
herein proposed.' Economic power, rather than remaining con-
centrated in the hands of a few, as when all property passed to an
eldest son, tends to dissipate if an ever-growing pie must serve an
ever-increasingnumber of diners.8 Adding beneficiaries in perpe-
tuity would certainly dissolve, not concentrate, wealth under a
family development deduction scheme.
B. Technical Features to Enhance the Planning Flexibility of
Family Development Deduction Trust Benefactors
Because large transfers of wealth to a family development de-
duction trust could initially produce more trust income than ag-
gregate grants, a transferor would want to have wide discretion
82. See 5A SCOTt, supra note 77, § 591.
83. See Craig F. Frederickson, The Dynasty Trust Is Here!, PROB. L.J. OF OHIO,
JaniFeb. 1999, at 41.
84. In any event, stocks and other securities held in large amounts to provide ad hoc
distributions to a growing number of recipients under a family development deduction
trust would spread wealth and pose no greater threat to alienability than the holding of
billions of dollars in pension trusts for indefinite durations.
85. Over time, the pie might even shrink as takers grow in number-as happened for
many trust fund beneficiaries during the 1930s. See M. & C. Creditors Corp. v. Pratt, 17
N.Y.S.2d 240, 250 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938). Pratt involved payment of more than $424,000 to
the executors of a deceased partner who died just before the October 1929 stock market
crash. Id. at 243. Subsequently, the business became bankrupt, causing an unsuccessful
attempt by its creditors to recover the payment because of loss of value between the date
of death and the date of payment. Id. at 243-44, 266.
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to permit the trustee to make interim distributions to designated
charitable beneficiaries. 6 Simultaneously, the transferor might
want to have broad discretion to define "family" in such a way
that potential noncharitable beneficiaries immediately constitute
a class numerous enough to generate meritorious grant requests
equal to a substantial portion of trust income. For example, a
benefactor might define a "family" as consisting of all descen-
dants of the benefactor's great-grandparents down to a degree of
consanguinity that would permit an immediately broad distribu-
tion potential.17 Similarly, a benefactor might allow for construc-
tive family member status by including, perhaps temporarily,
persons not sharing blood with the benefactor.
An obvious extension beyond consanguinity would include in-
laws. Beyond marital relationships, however, other beneficiaries
could include employees, or classes of employees, of a family en-
terprise,8 friends and close acquaintances specifically desig-
nated, 9 members of religious organizations with whom the bene-
factor worshipped,9" classes of alumni of an educational
institution the benefactor enjoyed attending, or any other group
of persons with whom the benefactor shared experiences or rela-
tionships of a particular definable quality.9' The concept of "fam-
ily" could expand to enhance the number and diversity of worthy
grantees while bonding the blood and non-blood relationships
enjoyed by the benefactor into a cohesive group under one name.
86. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (regarding the income tax implications
to the trust of interim charitable distributions).
87. Presumably, no technical objection would result from the benefactor's excluding-
for personal reasons-certain "branches" of family members even while adopting a gener-
ally broad family definition. Overly specific exclusions, however, would not comport with
the family cohesion ideal behind family development deduction trusts.
88. Inclusion of a benefactor's employees would add a new twist on the well-worn legal
issue of whether a provider of services takes the status of an employee or an independent
contractor. For more information on the federal tax aspects of this issue, see Rev. Rul. 87-
41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (1987).
89. A benefactor should carefully define any class of "friends" and not simply leave the
task to another. See Clark v. Campbell, 133 A. 166, 170-71 (N.H. 1926) (involving a be-
quest for the benefit of a testator's "friends" which failed for want of certainty of the bene-
ficiaries).
90. The benefactor might want to refer to an official registry for a house of worship at
a specific location, as well as define a time during which membership would count.
91. The benefactor in Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 63 S.E.2d 786 (Va.
1951), left his entire estate to benefit the children of a public school he attended. Id. at
788. Unfortunately for the school children, the bequest failed under the rule against per-
petuities. Id. at 794.
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For sufficiently large fortunes, the transferor might expand the
non-blood group to cover descendants to a particular degree of
relationship.92 The non-blood group might expand until it encoun-
ters a preset limitation, then follow a course of attrition timed
with the expansion of the benefactor's own blood line.93 For ex-
ample, the non-blood group's expansion might arbitrarily meet a
limitation when the blood group reached 100, 1000, or 10,000
members, or when the blood group (perhaps with spouses) con-
tained a designated number of great-grandchildren, or when
meritorious grants first exceed distributions to charitable organi-
zations serving as alternate takers of trust income in early
years.94
In addition to setting a flexible definition of the family class,
transferors to family development deduction trusts might want to
express some preference for when or how the trust corpus would
ultimately reach extinguishment. If the benefactor desired per-
petuation of the trust corpus, a volume of worthy grant applica-
tions that substantially exceeded the trust income might trigger a
clause in the trust instrument that prioritized grants according to
the benefactor's wishes.95 Thus, grants for education or medical
needs might take priority over grants for small business or career
development. The benefactor should have the power to address
both low and extraordinarily high grant demand as the class of
beneficiaries waxes and wanes.96
Also, permitted grant criteria should express a range of values
and concerns that benefactors could adopt or reject in part ac-
cording to personal preferences. Considering the wide variations
of expression now permitted for religious organizations that enjoy
92. If desired, the defined expansion could also include parents and grandparents of
the non-blood members primarily designated.
93. With time, both the non-blood and blood groups would contain only persons who
never personally knew the benefactor, but the benefactor might assert a preference for
blood relatives, in effect using the group of non-blood persons as 'filler" beneficiaries
pending sufficient growth in the blood group.
94. A benefactor could define contingent groups of non-blood beneficiaries that would
take from the fund in the event the blood group might increase initially but later shrink.
The birth rates of various groups could obviously fluctuate greatly over many decades.
95. Not every benefactor would necessarily want a family development deduction
trust to continue indefinitely. Extinguishment might occur by design once the demand for
grants surpassed the truses income and the trustee was permitted to tap corpus.
96. Default gifts to charities would solve the problem of beneficiary groups that might
die out. Escheat to the state presents another solution.
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tax benefits, benefactors of family development deduction trusts
should have freedom to structure their distribution choices with
only minimal governmental intervention or political judgments.
For instance, benefactors should have equal power to fund grants
to permit stay-at-home parenting as well as to assist working
parents in affording childcare expenses, depending on the bene-
factor's personal attitude toward the respective values of sus-
tained parental contact versus career enabling. The overall crite-
ria for grant allowability should reflect broad standards for
salutary human development and sustenance as viewed by the
grantor, whose well-expressed intentions would illuminate the
trust instrument. 98
Of course, the benefactor of a family development deduction
trust should also have the discretion to draft administrative
guidelines for the operation of the trust. These guidelines would
have to conform with existing trust law, 99 but one special policy
aspect of family development deduction trust administration
would have to come to the attention of both trustors and those
who make or interpret law-the role of family members serving
as advisors to the trustee, setting standards for grant review, and
encouraging family cohesiveness as envisioned by the benefactor.
As the family grows, it should coalesce, not just on the common
ground of eligibility for distributions, but also to celebrate and ef-
fectuate the benefactor's respect for personal growth, family
unity, duty, largess, and stewardship for family resources. °0 Few
administrative paradigms would encourage extended family in-
volvement better than today's model for the governance of educa-
tional and other institutions by means of centralized alumni
(member) record keeping, open reunions, written communica-
97. Even charitable organizations cannot structure their operations in a manner that
violates fundamental public policy and still retain tax benefits. See Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983) (disallowing tax exemption for a university that
prohibited interracial dating and marriage).
98. A regulatory standard could prohibit any distributions to support extravagant,
ostentatious, or redundant consumption by beneficiaries of a family development deduc-
tion trust.
99. Thus, family development deduction trust fiduciaries would have to observe local
law restrictions against improper investments, conflicts of interest, loose bookkeeping, and
the like. See generally 2A, 3, 3A ScoTT, supra note 77, at ch. 7.
100. Stewardship for family resources would come forth as family members selected
advisors from among themselves to determine grants upon the relative merits of requests.
Using these advisors to review investment decisions for the trust fund would also promote
family stewardship.
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tions, election of properly nominated persons to group leadership,
and similar devices that create and sustain a sense of franchise
and community among a widely scattered and diverse member-
ship. 10'
C. Technical Features to Curb Potential Abuses of Family
Development Deduction Trusts
Any arrangement that creates substantial tax benefits invites
conflicts between regulatory forces attempting to uphold the ar-
rangement's purposes and individuals wanting to take tax bene-
fits while ignoring the practical execution of policies that moti-
vate those benefits.' °2 Accordingly, a set of rules designed to
permit family development deductions would have to account for
potential abuses. Benefactors and their families would have to
use the assets held in trust for the purposes of encouraging bene-
ficial personal development, family cohesiveness, and direct or
indirect social consequences that benefit the community at
large.0 3 Abuses might take the form of self-dealing with trust as-
sets, collusive strategies for the awarding of inappropriate grants,
or misapplications of grants into the hands of individuals who
might use their distributions for the consumption of goods and
services unrelated to the trust's purposes.
Congress protected individual retirement accounts from many
potential abuses by requiring institutional trustees.0 4 Requiring
101. Term limitations would help assure that family members elected to advisory posi-
tions would turn over often enough to prevent sustained and concentrated influences and
permit participation by the greatest number of individuals.
102. The realm of tax-favored retirement arrangements produced such conflicts, caus-
ing Congress to enact extensive legislation to address both tax and labor law concerns re-
specting pensions. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) ("ERISA"). Hopefully, proper regulation of family development
deduction trusts would not necessitate legislative efforts anywhere near as extensive as
ERISA. But even if family development deduction trusts did ultimately cause extensive
statutory control, their social benefits would outweigh their regulatory burdens, like tax-
favored pension plans.
103. A community could benefit from family development deduction trust distributions
in various ways-through lessening burdens on local governments with direct economic
assistance to needy beneficiaries, encouraging cultural and educational attainments, and
lessening economic tensions that can destroy families.
104. See I.R.C. § 408(a)(2) (1994) (requiring that the trustee of an individual retirement
account be a bank "or such other person who demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secre-
tary that the manner in which such other person will administer the trust will be consis-
tent with the requirements of this section").
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institutional oversight for family development deduction trusts
would lead to commercial fees, investment selection accommoda-
tions, or both. Like pension funds and estate planning trusts,
however, family development deduction trusts certainly would
have ample resources to pay for competent institutional over-
sight. Since family development deduction trusts might incorpo-
rate advisory input from a class of beneficiaries that would
change and grow, institutional trustees could serve as a stable
power to override grant recommendations that did not comport
with both the benefactor's expressed intentions and regulatory
requirements. °5
Institutional trustees could also protect the trust's assets
against various prohibited transactions, in parallel fashion to
pension trusts and tax-exempt organizations. The law pertaining
to prohibited transactions involving these established entities al-
ready contains well-developed proscriptions and exemptions. °6
Two-tiered penalty taxes first slap an abuser on the wrist, then
inflict a financial punch in the mouth if the abuser persists.
Similarly, regulators could use penalty taxes to control transac-
tional problems involving family development deduction trusts.0 7
No matter how well regulators might address potential abuses
involving grant discretion or prohibited transactions, the problem
of misspent distributions, involving distributees who might even
deliberately misrepresent their expenditure plans, would still
loom. Because grant administration issues arise for tax-exempt
organizations, the existing regulatory response to private chari-
table foundations in the form of an "expenditure responsibility"
concept could also apply to family development deduction
trusts.0 8 Thus, trustees could administer funds under duties to
105. As usual for tax-favored arrangements, trustees might resolve close questions in-
volving the application of statutory standards by seeking private letter rulings or deter-
mination letters from the Internal Revenue Service. See Treas. Reg. § 601.201 (as
amended in 1996).
106. See I.R.C. § 4975 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (outlining prohibited transactions in the
administration of retirement plans); I.R.C. § 4941 (1994) (respecting self-dealing involving
charitable private foundations).
107. Compare I.R.C. § 4941(a) (1994) (setting a first-tier tax of 5% of the amount in-
volved for self-dealing), with I.R.C. § 4941(b) (1994) (imposing a 200% second-tier tax ap-
plicable when the self-dealer does not correct the offending transaction in a timely man-
ner).
108. See I.R.C. § 4945 (1994); see also I.R.C. § 4945(a), (g) (1994) (imposing penalty
taxes on certain "taxable expenditures" which include unqualified grants from a private
foundation to individuals).
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conduct appropriate pre-grant investigations, collect pertinent
data, require post-grant reports, and implement follow-up proce-
dures to determine that grants have been spent according to trust
guidelines. °9
In order to enforce appropriate uses of distributions in the
hands of grantees, two additional devices could assist regulators.
First, a statute or regulation could impose a moratorium on fur-
ther distributions to an abusing grantee for a period of time cor-
responding with the severity and repetitiveness of abuses."0 Sec-
ond, the abusing distributee could incur a personal tax penalty
similar to the imposition against distributees of qualified retire-
ment plans who take pension monies either too early or too
late."' By such means, distributees would bear grant enforcement
responsibility beyond that of the fiduciaries of family develop-
ment deduction trusts.
Ultimately, an errant family development deduction trust, en-
gaging in flagrant and repeated violations, could trip a "recapture
tax" designed to make the Treasury whole upon a disqualification
procedure. Again, the regulation of tax-exempt organizations pro-
vides a useful parallel-a "termination" procedure permits the
Treasury to seize a tax-exempt organization's assets to repay cu-
mulative revenues lost up to the time of a finding that an organi-
zation's tax-exempt status cannot continue." 2
Rules for family development deduction trusts would, of course,
develop as a balance of emerging concerns and political consid-
erations." 3 In the realm of political considerations, two issues be-
109. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-4(c) (2000) (outlining detailed procedures to assure
proper grant-making by charitable private foundations).
110. For instance, a recipient who took a grant to attend college, but withdrew or suf-
fered academic dismissal, might have to wait two years before applying for another grant.
A recipient who took a series of grants to care for an ailing parent, but neglected to inform
the trustee that the parent had long ago died, might forever remain ineligible for any fur-
ther grants.
111. See I.R.C. § 72(t) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (imposing a ten percent penalty tax on top
of any regular income tax owed upon a premature distribution from a qualified retirement
plan).
112. See I.R.C. § 507 (1994) (imposing a confiscatory "termination tax" that could equal
the value of the net assets of a charitable foundation found to have committed "willful re-
peated acts" in contravention of its tax-exempt status).
113. Sometimes political forces against tax abuses have to build up over a period of
years before a regulatory response comes forth. Thus, the "tax shelter" promotions of the
1960s and 1970s, offering write-offs (deductions) as multiples of a taxpayer's investment
in certain limited partnerships, did not end until enactment of the passive activity loss
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yond the scope of this proposal might also emerge. First, to what
extent should existing allowances for the tax-free transmission of
wealth remain, expand, or possibly contract in light of a family
development deduction trust scheme?" 4 Second, to what extent
should an overall limitation for family development deductions
separate the "super rich" from the "merely rich"?'
V. CONCLUSION
Anyone reading this article could have descendants who might
become beneficiaries of a family development deduction trust if
permitted as herein proposed. Over time, billions of dollars held
in thousands of such trusts could inure to the potential benefit of
millions of people. The resulting personal and community en-
richment would parallel the extent and diversity of benefits now
realized under charitable trusts and foundations. Expanding
groups of potential beneficiaries would share common interests
that demonstrate very tangibly how we all relate to one another
within a larger context. Money, instead of producing divisiveness,
could serve as a means to bring large numbers of people together
for the common purpose of human development. Benefactors
would perpetuate their memories and establish positions of honor
within their families, not just as originators of wealth, but also as
facilitators of enduring values." 6
Technical features to prevent potential abuses and give bene-
factors flexibility in setting reasonable distribution priorities
limitation rules, I.R.C. § 469 (1994), in 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
Tit. V, 100 Stat. 2085, 2233 (1986).
114. In particular, should Congress adjust the wealth transfer taxation unified credit
amounts of I.R.C § 2010 and § 2505? See supra note 21. Should Congress also adjust the
wealth transfer tax rate structure of I.R.C. § 2001(c)?
115. An argument against limitation would emphasize that the larger the fortune left
in perpetuity to benefit an expanding beneficiary class, the greater the disbursement of
wealth and resulting social benefit. Note also that no dollar limitations restrict charitable
deductions for wealth transfers under either the gift tax or estate tax provisions of I.R.C. §
2522 and § 2055, respectively.
116. Some families do a wonderful job of preserving family memories and sensibilities
over many generations. See Pui-Wing Tam, A Parchment Unveils a Family's Past, WALL
ST. J., May 17, 2000, at A24 (describing eloquently a sense of family identity that spans
thirty-one generations, going back to an ancestor who served as a court official in the Song
Dynasty in northern China in 962 A.D.). Family development deduction trusts would have
the potential to preserve such a sense of family identity for a very large number of Ameri-
cans.
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could ensure that public and private interests need not clash un-
der a family development deduction scheme. The current system
for wealth transfer taxation does not have to disappear and could
serve as a backup for benefactors who insist, despite the tax cost,
on transferring large concentrations of wealth for the inordinate
benefit of their progeny.
A reasonable range of permissible distributions from family de-
velopment deduction trusts could manifest social benefit on par
with traditional charitable giving and include outlays that di-
rectly or indirectly benefit existing charitable organizations."'
Additionally, family development deduction trusts would effec-
tively blend competing political philosophies into one technical
mechanism that lets charity begin at home and greatly encour-
ages family values while addressing larger social concerns. Con-
gress might repeal wealth transfer taxes sooner or later, and just
as easily reinstate these taxes upon changing its composition.
Creation of a family development deduction, however, would ef-
fect a much more vital and enduring result than acceding in an
all-or-nothing fashion to either the proponents or opponents of
wealth transfer taxation.
117. The existing wealth transfer taxation system already gives implicit approval for
the tax exemption of certain kinds of transfers which, though benefiting only individuals
and not charitable organizations, nonetheless have such intrinsic social benefit that trans-
fer taxation should not impede their flow. Thus, I.R.C. § 2503(e) permits the tax-free
transfer of unlimited amounts to pay the tuition or medical expenses of family members or
others. See supra note 21. Family development deduction trusts would simply extend the
concept behind this exemption to a broader range of personal and social benefits for an
ever-expanding class of individuals.
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